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1. Introduction 
Teacher: "Now, kids, this is a book about dinosaurs. Are dinosaurs alive today?"  
Preschooler 1: "Yeah, at the zoo." 
Preschooler 2: "I saw one on TV." 
Teacher: "The ones at the zoo are just pretend dinosaurs, aren't they? (Children nod). 
Does anyone know what the word 'extinct' means?" 
Preschooler 3: "I farted ..." 
Teacher: "Say 'Excuse me.'" 
Preschooler 3 continues: "... in my house." 
Teacher: "Let's keep thinking about dinosaurs...." 
30 minutes later, Teacher: "Okay, listen up. I want you to think about what you've 
learned today. Can anyone tell me something they learned about dinosaurs?" 
Several Preschoolers: "They're mean." 
Teacher: "They're mean? Okay. Does anyone remember what the word 'extinct' means?" 
Preschooler 4: "Farted." 
(Pfeiffer, 2012) 
After Piaget’s seminal claims on children’s slow emergence of adult-like thought, research in 
cognitive development has skyrocketed to reveal ever-so-amazing competencies in younger 
and younger children. These competencies pertain to understanding cause-effect relations, 
physical truisms, or mathematical operations, to name just a few (e.g., see Bremner & Fogel, 
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2004, for a summary). Many of these findings have had the effect of changing how children 
are taught, for example by pushing more complex curricula early on, building upon 
children’s already existing understanding, and supporting children’s abstract reasoning 
skills (e.g., Brenneman, Stevenson-Boyd & Frede, 2009; Eshach & Fried, 2005). In the current 
chapter we review the research findings of these efforts, focusing explicitly on early science 
learning.  
The area of science learning, while only a small part within the field of children's learning, 
has several features that warrant interest for the cognitive-development community. First 
science concepts are abstract, transcending a concrete context that commonly embeds 
everyday concepts. As such, science learning relates to the emergence of abstract thought, 
knowledge transfer and symbol manipulation. Second, scientific concept formation is a 
specific case of everyday concept formation, thus shedding light on the dynamics of 
collapsing large amounts of information into systematic beliefs (cf., Havu-Nuutinen, 2005). 
Third, a focus on early learning is likely to uncover the spontaneous working of the mind, 
processes yet unaffected by formal instruction or by standardized assessment. An 
understanding of preschoolers' science learning therefore transcends the field of early 
childhood education and sheds light on the spontaneous development of abstract thought in 
young children.  
Note first that early science learning is a rather unorganized terrain. Unlike the areas of 
reading or math, this area still grapples with questions of what constitutes success in science 
learning, how learning should progress, and how to assess its milestones. There are no 
generally agreed-upon ‘letters’ that form the alphabet of science, and there are no central 
‘operations’ in science that constitute the base upon which to build. Indeed, research studies 
differ greatly in how ‘science’ is defined in the first place, for example whether science 
concepts need to be abstract, relevant to every-day experience, or interconnected with other 
concepts. Similarly, assessment tools differ greatly in whether they measure the presence of 
a particular concept, the way it is applied, or its semantic network. As a result, there are no 
generally accepted instructional tools (cf., Kirchner, Sweller & Clark, 2006), and there are no 
generally accepted assessments that could capture milestones of science learning across 
curricula (for reviews see Brenneman, 2011; Scott-Little, Lesko, Martella, & Milburn, 2007). 
The current chapter is a first step towards filling this gap.  
For our purposes, science is defined to incorporate two aspects: scientific facts and concepts, 
and the processes by which science knowledge is generated. These two aspects – knowledge 
of science concepts and knowledge of how the science concepts were derived – are of course 
closely linked (cf. Schauble, 1990). We nevertheless treat them as separate for the purpose of 
organizing the research findings on early science learning. Note also that this review is by 
no means exhaustive. The literature on young children’s science learning has exploded in 
the last decade, being published in numerous educational and cognitive-development 
journals, as well as in journals devoted to this topic entirely (e.g., Science and Children; 
Research in Science Education). Here we present a cross-section of pertinent research, as a 
means of finding a common thread and setting the stage for a more integrated discussion 
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about young children’s learning. For example, we describe research on how to support 
young children’s reasoning about abstract concepts, how to replace their mistaken beliefs 
with more appropriate ones, how to engage them in scientific discourse and explorations, 
and how to scaffold their attempt to organize isolated pieces of knowledge into coherent 
networks of interrelated facts.  
2. Can preschoolers learn about scientific facts? 
A central part of science is a shared understanding of concepts and facts, for example from 
the domain of physical sciences, life sciences, or earth and space sciences. Research in 
cognitive development has documented that even young children know something about 
these science domains. For example, young children know that the behavior of objects is 
affected by their physical properties (cf., Kotovsky & Baillargeon, 1998; Schilling & Clifton, 
1998); they know that the identity of living things is determined internally (Simons & Keil, 
1995; Springer, 1995); and they understand the effect of gravity (e.g., Vosniadou, 1994). Of 
course, sometimes their beliefs are mistaken; they hold misconceptions. For example, 
children believe that heavy stuff sinks fast (e.g., Kloos & Somerville, 2001; Penner & Klahr, 
1996), that the sun is alive, but not plants (Venville, 2004), or that the earth is disc-shaped 
(e.g., Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). To what extent can early science instruction build upon 
children’s existing knowledge to convey new facts and change mistaken beliefs?  
Conveying Something New. Science facts differ in the degree to which they rely on concrete 
versus abstract pieces of information. That is to say, science facts vary in whether relevant 
pieces of information are readily perceivable – or whether they need to be extracted from 
irrelevant information. That a spider has eight legs requires a relatively low level of 
abstraction, because the fact’s relevant pieces of information are readily accessible in a 
single event. By contrast, the idea that caterpillars turn into butterflies is more abstract: 
caterpillars and butterflies need to be conceptually connected, while differences between 
the two need to be ignored (e.g., shape, behavior). Similarly, the idea that water can turn 
into ice is less abstract than the idea that materials consist of particles that are invisible to 
the naked eye. The latter requires the learner to ignore salient features of an object (e.g., 
the shape or size of a material), and instead note underlying patterns of how materials 
interact and change.   
Can young children learn low-abstraction science facts? This question is relatively trivial, as 
one might guess from every-day experiences with children (e.g., Cumming, 2003). For 
example, preschoolers can learn with little effort the names of new species, the names of the 
planets, and even the terms associated with material properties and chemical change (e.g., 
Fleer & Hardy, 1993). However, educators sometimes worry that children’s learning of facts 
is no more than passive rote memorization, far from reflecting ‘truly understanding’ the 
facts. At the crux of this concern is that young children might not be able to go beyond mere 
facts to interconnect them under a common concept. Even though there is evidence of 
spontaneous abstractions in young children (e.g., Hickling & Gelman 1995; Hickling & 
 Current Topics in Children's Learning and Cognition 48 
Wellman, 2001), higher-order concepts pertinent to science knowledge might be too abstract 
for them. The more central question, therefore, is whether young children can learn abstract 
concepts.  
There is an interesting drawback when it comes to learning abstract concepts. Unlike what 
one would expect, findings show that overly detailed and richly embedded learning 
materials have a negative impact on children’s ability to abstract underlying concepts (e.g., 
Goldstone & Sakamoto, 2003; Goldstone, & Son; 2005; Kaminski, Sloutsky, & Heckler, 2008; 
Ratterman, Gentner, & DeLoache, 1990; Son, Smith, & Goldstone, 2008). For example, when 
the learning materials were colored shaped intricately, children had more difficulty 
discovering an abstract mathematical rule than when the materials were black-and-white 
simple shapes (Kaminski et al., 2008). When the shapes were such that they helped children 
intuit the rules, learning improved, but transfer to a new task nevertheless suffered, 
compared to using none-specific and generic shapes (see also DeLoache, 1995; Bassok & 
Holyoak, 1989; Mix, 1999; Ratterman & Gentner, 1998; Sloutsky, Kaminski, & Heckler, 2005; 
Uttal, Liu, & DeLoache, 1999; Uttal, Scudder, & DeLoache, 1997). Taken together, there 
seems to be a pronounced advantage of sparse contexts when learning abstract concepts. 
The advantage lies in minimizing distraction, undermining the possibility of forming 
mistaken ideas, and highlighting relevant pieces of information.  
Of course, when it comes to young children, a motivational factor needs to be taken into 
account (cf., Mantzicopoulos, Patrick, & Samarapungavan  2008; Zembylas, 2008). A setting 
without rich details might fail to engage the child sufficiently to prompt learning. For 
example, a young child might not be inclined to explore objects unless they vary in color, 
shape, and texture in interesting ways. Therefore, to make abstract ideas accessible to young 
children, it might not be possible to strip the context of any unnecessary complexity. A 
different approach to instruction is needed, one that helps make abstract ideas visible to 
children, while, at the same time, retaining a richly detailed context. Such approach might 
require a pedagogy that bootstraps the understanding of abstract ideas, rather than waiting 
for young children to detect them by themselves. Findings show that such approach is 
indeed possible.  
Take for example the abstract idea of object conservation, the idea that matter exists, even 
when it is not visible with the naked eye. To understand this concept, children have to 
ignore their phenomenological experience of an object’s presence and therefore engage in 
abstract reasoning. Immersing children into a richly detailed environment might not make 
this abstract idea salient. On the other hand, providing children with the opportunity to 
reflect on guided explorations of material transformation improved their understanding of 
object conservation (Acher, Arca & Sanmarti, 2007). In particular, 7- to 8-year-olds were 
asked to observe possible changes in materials (e.g., stones, wood, water, metal) when they 
were trying to break them down, mix them in water, or burn them. After each manipulation, 
children were encouraged to draw the changes they observed in the materials. They also 
participated in group discussions designed to help them conceptualize their experiences. 
Findings show not only that children were able to express opinions and counter arguments, 
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but also that they could understand object conservation. Even 5-year-old preschoolers can 
appreciate the idea that water, when invisible to the naked eye, is nevertheless still present 
in some form (Tytler & Peterson, 2000).  
Replacing Existing Beliefs. Learning about a new science concept can be problematic, beyond 
the required abstract-reasoning skills. This is because in some cases, children’s naïve ideas 
about the domain conflict with the pertinent science concept. The detrimental power of 
mistaken ideas has been recognized for decades, leading to extensive research into 
understanding both the nature of the misconceptions across ages and how they can be 
changed (e.g., see Ohlsson, 2011; Vosniadou, 2008, for an extensive discussion). Indeed, 
existing misconceptions appear to be very difficult to change (e.g., Anderson & Smith, l987; 
Gunstone, Champagne, & Klopfer, 1981; Hannust, & Kikas, 2007; Kloos & Somerville, 2001; 
Linn & Burbules, 1988; Schneps, 1987). In many instances, children prefer mistaken ideas 
over correct ideas, even after extensive training and even after shortcomings of mistaken 
ideas have been pointed out explicitly. Take for example findings with 5- to 7-year-olds who 
participated in an astronomy curriculum on the spherical properties of the earth (Hannust, 
& Kikas, 2007). The four-week curriculum involved hands-on mini-lessons designed to 
target several apparent contractions, for example why the earth is perceived to be flat, or 
why people living on the “down-side” of the earth do not fall off. Yet, despite this relatively 
extensive intervention, children’s understanding did not change significantly over the 
course of the instruction. While their performance on a pretest was below chance (11% 
correct), it stayed low even after the lessons (15% correct). In fact, results show that children 
relied more heavily on their phenomenological experience after instruction than before (see 
also Kloos & Van Orden, 2005 for similar counter effects of teaching interventions).  
Given such resistance to change, one might speculate that a child’s mistaken ideas are 
innate. But upon closer look into the nature of beliefs, it turns out that misconceptions arise 
when misleading pieces of information are more salient than pieces of information that are 
relevant to the particular science concept (cf., Kloos, Fisher, & Van Orden, 2010). Therefore, 
to change a child’s mistaken ideas in a science domain, a pedagogical approach is needed 
that can change the salience of relevant compared to irrelevant pieces of information (i.e., 
increase the salience of science-relevant pieces of information). With such change in making 
relevant information salient, misconceptions might be avoided altogether. Indeed, children 
who have benefitted from focused instruction seem to harbor fewer misconceptions in later 
years at school (cf., Novak & Gowin, 1984.)   
A promising approach in this regard is the use of conceptual models, also known as 
conceptual schemas, mental models, or scientific models (e.g., Glynn & Duit, 1995; Kenyon, 
Schwarz, & Hug, 2008; Mayer, 1989, Penner, Giles, Lehrer, & Schauble, 1997; Smith, Snir, & 
Grosslight, 1992; Smith & Unger, 1997, for a review see Vosniadou, 2008). Conceptual 
models are abstract representations of a science phenomenon – external diagrams of some 
sort that children can internalize. Models do not represent the real world in its full degree of 
complexity. Instead, they are schematics of the real world, designed to highlight only a 
selected number of relations (the ones that are relevant to the science concept of interest), 
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while downplaying other relations (ones that are less relevant or misleading). Importantly, 
models represent predictive and explanatory rules, thus making visible the components of 
science phenomenon that are difficult to be perceived on the basis of phenomenological 
experience alone. As such, they make relevant science facts salient, in effect decreasing the 
salience of irrelevant pieces of information.  
There are several studies that show the effectiveness of conceptual models in young children 
(e.g., Gobert & Buckley, 2000; Kenyon et al. 2008; Wiser & Smith, 2008; Baker, Haussmann, 
Kloos, & Fisher, 2011). An illustrative example uses the science domain of material density,  
a concept that is defined by the ratio of the two highly salient dimensions of mass and 
volume. Predictably, children often ignore density and use instead perceived heaviness of 
an object as the sole predictor of the object’s buoyancy (e.g., Piaget & Inhelder, 1974; Kloos et 
al., 2010). To help children overcome this mistaken focus on an object’s heaviness, a 
conceptual model of density was developed, also known as dot-per-box (e.g., Smith & 
Unger, 1997; Wiser & Smith, 2008). It involves a display in which the volume of an object is 
represented as a certain number of boxes, and mass is represented as number of dots inside 
the boxes. Thus, density is represented as the spacing between dots (the more crowded the 
dots, the more dense the material); and irrelevant variation of color, shape, and texture are 
omitted. Thus, density of the material is now similar in salience to that of mass or volume. 
Children indeed benefited from these abstract representations of density (for a discussion of 
these findings, see Wiser & Smith, 2008). Similar learning success was reported with 4- to 5-
year-olds, whether children were recruited from Head Start preschools or from preschools 
serving upper middle class families (Baker et al., 2011).  
Introducing conceptual models early on might have a positive effect on learning as children 
get older. Support for this claim comes from research in the domain of evaporation and 
condensation, another domain that is a notoriously difficult area of instruction in science 
(Kenyon et al., 2008). Children between 6 and 8 years of age underwent a multi-week 
training on evaporation and condensation, which included observing the evaporation and 
condensation in a soda bottle, drawing diagrams to capture the system through various 
moments in time, testing their models through experiments, using tools to measure the 
amount of water in the air, and revising their models as needed. Findings show that the 
instructed students significantly outperformed the uninstructed students in their 
understanding of relevant concepts. Importantly, when students began the formal study of 
science in Grade 7, instructed students improve in their understanding of concepts much 
faster than uninstructed students. Clearly, the students who were helped to form basic 
science concepts in early grades had developed an understanding of the domain that 
continued to facilitate their meaningful learning, further developing their understandings 
and reducing their misconceptions (for related discussions, see Muthukrishna, Carnine, 
Grossen, & Miller, 1993). 
In sum, research-based evidence points in a clear direction when it comes to promoting an 
understanding of science concepts. Unlike what a Piagetian stage model of abstract 
reasoning might imply, young children are indeed able to learn abstract concepts early on, 
even when the concepts run counter to what children already believe. Their learning 
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strongly depends on an instructional environment that makes abstract relations salient, 
allowing them to visualize the relations without getting distracted by irrelevant information 
in the immediate context. To put it more pointedly, the limits on a child’s ability to learn 
abstract science concepts might be the limits of the instruction that is provided. Open 
questions pertain to the exact interplay between decontextualized and carefully simplified 
environments to maximize children’s learning about science concepts and events directly 
related to their lives (e.g., food, weather, seasons, animals, vehicles, light, magnets, etc.). 
3. Can preschoolers learn to generate science knowledge? 
The second aspect of science learning pertains to understanding the process by which 
science knowledge is generated. Rather than learning about established and accepted 
science facts and concepts, this aspect includes an understanding of how science facts are 
generated in the first place. This includes the ability to create settings that are sufficiently 
informative for science knowledge to be generated. And it includes the meta-cognitive 
understanding of how new information can change existing knowledge. It is important to 
note that the process of generating science concepts is in part affected by cultural norms. 
Norms pertain to constraints about what to count as an explanation of events (cf., Pearl, 
2009), under what circumstances to abandon an existing theory (cf. Kuhn, 1996), or how to 
treat expected versus unexpected observations (cf., Popper, 1959). So far, these constraints 
have not been studied explicitly in the realm of early science learning. Instead, the emphasis 
is on understanding how children’s everyday interactions with their environment can help 
children generate science knowledge (e.g., Zimmerman, 2000).  
The question of children’s ability to generate science knowledge through observations is 
debated heavily, both in cognitive development and in educational research. In cognitive 
development, the ongoing debate centers on the question of whether young children are at 
all capable of engaging in appropriate knowledge-generating activities. Such activities, 
referred to as scientific reasoning, require the child to detect gaps in their existing knowledge 
base, ask questions in response to the identified gaps, carry out the experiments that could 
lead to an answer, and critically evaluate the evidence (cf., Klahr, 2005). Each one of these 
steps can be difficult for children (and even for adults), for several reasons: First, the mind is 
biased towards perceiving order, making it difficult to perceive disorder, missing 
information, or gaps (cf., e.g., Quinn, Eimas, & Rosenkrantz, 1993). Second, the mind is 
biased towards confirming already existing beliefs, rather than questioning their 
shortcomings, making it difficult to spontaneously challenge existing beliefs (e.g., Schauble, 
1990). Under this view, scientific reasoning has to be trained explicitly.  
In contrast to the cognitive-development debate, educational research already presupposes 
the child’s ability to generate science knowledge, following the theoretical bent of 
constructivism (cf., Olson, 1996). For example, it is generally accepted that children can 
engage in inquiry, the processes of wondering, questioning, exploring, investigating, 
discussing, reflecting, and formulating ideas and theories (e.g., Kuhn, 2010). Indeed, 
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preschool education places strong emphasis on exploration, the idea being that exploration 
is at the center of what allows children to generate knowledge about the world (e.g., Luken, 
Carr, & Brown, 2011). The debate then centers on the question of how children’s 
spontaneous inquiry can be supported by teacher interventions, explicit instruction, and/or 
feedback. In what follows, we review findings that speak to this question. In particular, we 
focus on the efficacy of three strategies that help children generate science knowledge. They 
include (1) engaging children in scientific discourse, (2) teaching them to keep track of their 
observations, and (3) helping them organize their knowledge. 
Can young children engage in scientific discourse? What is also referred to as ‘science talk’ 
(Lemke, 1990) or exploratory language (Peterson & French, 2008), scientific discourse differs 
from a standard question-answer format for which the person asking the question already 
knows, expects to hear, and rewards the right answer. Scientific discourse instead promotes 
sense-making of events: accepted science terms, concepts, and methods are transmitted in 
the context of children asking scientifically valid questions (cf., Crowder, 1996). It is 
therefore a large part of inquiry and scientific reasoning. While scientific discourse is heavily 
studied in school-aged children (e.g., Kafai & Carter Ching, 2001), preschool teachers and 
parents of young children are likely to engage in such discourse naturally, as they guide 
children’s explorations of topics relevant to their everyday life. The ideal context is likely to 
require an active and knowledgeable listeners and a shared science vocabulary that children 
are sufficiently comfortable with (cf., Crowley, Callanan, Jipson, et al., 2001; Fleer, 1996; 
Pramling & Pramling-Samuelson, 2001).  
The effectiveness of science talk with preschoolers was demonstrated empirically with the 
domains of metamorphosis and plant growth (e.g., Witt & Kimple, 2008). Children were first 
given a pretest on these two science domains, asking questions such as What is a cocoon?, 
What kind of food helps caterpillars and butterflies grow?, How does a plant soak up water?, and Do 
seeds grow faster in direct sunlight, darkness, or a mixture of both?. Preschoolers then 
participated in two several-weeks-long activities, one pertaining to creating an environment 
for caterpillars and observing the metamorphosis, and one pertaining to planting seeds and 
observing the growth in different climates and environments (e.g., hot and sunny vs. cold 
and dark). Preschoolers were frequently engaged in conversations, allowing them to reflect 
on their observations and experience. Post-test performance showed remarkable 
improvement in science knowledge: Every child improved in their answers, and every 
question showed gains. For example, while none of the preschoolers knew the meaning of 
‘cocoon’ or the conditions under which seeds grow best, all of them did so during the 
posttest.  
Promising results for the effectiveness of science talk were also reported with the domain of 
electrical currents (Fleer, 1991; Fleer & Beasley, 1991). The task was to explore flashlights, 
find out what they are made out of and how they work, and construct their own flashlights 
using batteries, bulbs, and wires. With the use of guided interaction with the teachers, 
preschoolers and 1st-graders learned to formulate questions about the working of the 
flashlights, and they learned to report the findings of their own explorations.  Even better 
results were obtained when children were given direct instruction on how the electricity 
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flowed around the circuit, both through the reading of factual books, and through one-on-
one interactions with the teachers as children explored the materials. In particular, after 
direct instruction, all children could talk about how the electricity continuously flowed 
around a simple electric circuit, an understanding they still held 2 months later. Without 
such direct instruction, and despite being able to connect the circuit, children’s beliefs about 
electricity, measured through their entries in a ‘notebook’ did not change over the course of 
three months: All children with comparison data expressed exactly the same view of 
'electricity' in both interviews.  
As this previous study implies, a scientific discourse is aided when children can keep track 
of their explorations across time, for example in science journals. This is not only because 
children are exposed to richer information over time (e.g., to detect a contrast in an abstract 
dimension that is not available in snapshot events). Science journals also provide teachers 
with an opportunity to engage children in a targeted and individualized way (cf., Doris, 
1991; Light & Simmons 1983). Recent findings show that even preschoolers can be taught to 
keep a science journal (e.g., Brenneman & Louro 2008). This is might involve over-simplified 
drawings and an explanation written by a teacher. Nevertheless, they provide an authentic 
medium for teachers to encourage scientific reasoning. For example, children’s drawings 
make it possible for teachers to convey the difference between true observations and a 
child’s imagination, the importance of dating the entries, and the focus on hidden features 
(e.g., the inside of a pumpkin). The outcome was a rich interaction between teachers and 
preschoolers, promoting children’s ability to observe objectively, to record observations 
with some precision, and to become aware of patterns of change..  
So far, we have discussed the benefits of engaging children in science talk and encouraging 
them to make note of their observations. An even more targeted way of helping children 
generate science knowledge involves helping them organize their observations and beliefs 
in a systematic way. It involves the use of so-called concept maps (cf., Novak, 2010). 
Concept maps consist of nodes (to represent objects) and arrows between nodes (to 
represent events). The resulting flow charts (e.g., ‘plants  go in  gardens’) can be 
organized hierarchically to capture the relations between what children think and 
experience. For example, when presented with a targeted question about the cycle of 
growth, concepts maps make it possible for children to organize information about animals 
and plants in a way that yields both relevant science knowledge and an understanding of 
how such knowledge could be generated.  
The Young Florida Naturalist Program used such a concept-map strategy with 3- to 4-year-
olds from urban early childhood center children (e.g., Hunter, Monroe-Ossi, & Fountain, 
2008). The goal was to increase children’s knowledge about the butterfly life cycle and plant 
growth over the course of an eight-week instructional period. A concept map was 
constructed first, using a set of pertinent pictures (e.g., tree roots, leaves, caterpillars, 
butterflies, cocoons), to capture children’s initial understandings. The concept map was then 
posted in the classroom as a point of reference, and to allow for modifications as children 
learned new information. To stimulate children’s thinking, a butterfly garden was planted 
on the center’s grounds, and children engaged in various experiments with water, sunlight, 
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soil, etc. to explore plant growth. At the end of the period, children’s understanding was 
assessed in semi-structured interviews to infer a child’s individual concept map. For 
example, children were asked to sort and organize a set of pictures, they were encouraged to 
talk about what they know about plants and butterflies, and they were asked about their 
understandings of the final class concept map (e.g., ‘what do the pictures tell you about 
plants?”). Results document that a large majority of both 3- and 4-year-olds could make 
higher-order propositions, and they could recall terms and concepts relevant to parts of 
plants and aspects of butterfly transformation.  
Taken together, these results show that young children can benefit from quite sophisticated 
adult support in order to generate science-relevant knowledge. That is to say, children’s 
natural curiosity can be harnessed to help them explore their surroundings in scientifically 
appropriate ways. Adult support can range from merely providing children with a context 
for explorations to engaging them in guided discussions about their explorations, to helping 
them document their findings and organize their thoughts. As part of this process, young 
children are likely to learn the cultural norms of what is considered science, what counts as 
a worthwhile phenomenon, how it should be explored and evaluated, and what kind of 
knowledge construal would be acceptable (i.e., what can be ignored and what must be 
included). Open questions pertain to the relative benefit of allowing children to develop 
their own representations of what they observe versus working with representations 
provided to them in a top-down fashion.   
4. Coda  
Science is a rather difficult subject to teach, for several reasons. First, relevant science 
concepts are often far less salient than superficial aspects of an observation. In fact 
superficial features lead to mistaken beliefs that resist change. Second, science explorations 
require a level of systematicity that is difficult for young children to attain. Young children 
get easily distracted, failing to isolate relevant variables or to note their effect. Third, agreed 
upon scientific knowledge is incomplete – at least to some extent: it includes necessary 
simplifications to capture general rules and usable models. As such, there are choices to be 
made in terms of what to consider a valid science understanding. And finally, given that 
science understanding depends on the acquisition of a novel nomenclature and seemingly 
isolated facts, science learning can be dull and unmotivating.  
Nevertheless, young children are equipped to learn about scientific concepts early on, as 
cognitive-development research shows. Most importantly, they can organize individual 
experiences into over-arching patterns early on (cf., Thagard, 2000) – a process that forms 
the basic building block of the abstract reasoning necessary in science learning. Building 
upon these abilities, a variety of methods and pedagogical tools have shown to support 
early science learning (e.g., Worth and Grollman, 2003; Chalufour and Worth, 2003, 2004, 
2005). Summarizing across the available findings, the following aspects appear to play a 
crucial role. First, science learning is aided when children engage with scientifically literate 
adults who understand how to use scientifically valid representations and who anticipate 
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children’s already existing ideas about science (cf., Davis & Krajcik, 2005). Second, science 
learning is aided when intentional teaching is incorporated with play, such that teaching 
practices not only become purposeful and thoughtful, but also engage young children with 
topic-specific phenomena and inquiry (cf., Bodrova & Leong, 2007; Crowley & Jacobs, 2002; 
Copple & Bredekamp, 2009; NAEYC, 2009). The promise is to make accessible relevant 
science concepts to young children – even abstract concepts and those that run counter to 
already existing beliefs – forming the foundation upon which young learners will construct 
their ideas later in life (cf., Lucas, 1993).  
Research on early science learning also highlights the gaps that still remain in our 
understanding of children’s learning (cf., Davis, 2009). In fact, existing efforts to measure 
early science learning might be merely a first step. A more complete understanding calls for 
findings on how to best organize a child’s science education throughout the curriculum, 
how to measure their progress across science domains, how to harness individual 
differences among children, and what kind of early exposure leads to long-term gains in 
science learning. Related, empirical questions still remain about how inquiry and 
explorations interface with direct instructions of science concepts, and how a child’s attitude 
towards science learning both affects and is affected by learning of science. Without 
research-based findings to speak to these issues, our intuitions about early science learning, 
while fueling arguments among various viewpoints, might nevertheless jeopardize 
progression the area of early science learning.  
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